FRANCE
2024-2025 SCENARIO

MODEST GROWTH AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

October 2024

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WORKING EVERY DAY IN YOUR INTEREST AND FOR SOCIETY

GROUP ECONOMIC RESEARCH

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MODEST GROWTH AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

Forecasts finalised on 03/10/2024
Publication drafted on 14/10/2024

Scenario highlights

- **Disinflation is set to continue, generating purchasing power gains for wages.**
- **Household consumption is expected to accelerate, thereby supporting growth.**
- **Investment should rebound in 2025 as the key-rate cuts take effect; it would also be bolstered by the digital and ecological transitions.**
- **Investment would continue to be negatively impacted in H2 2024 by the past tightening of financial conditions.**
- **Annual growth is expected to remain moderate in 2024 and in 2025.**
- **The public deficit is expected to worsen in 2024 ahead of a substantial fiscal effort that will weigh on growth in 2025.**

France	2022	2023	2024	2025
GDP volume, sa-wda y/y, %	2.6	1.1	1.1	1.0
Domestic demand excl. inventories contribution to GDP, pp	2.4	0.9	0.4	0.7
Household consumption y/y, %	3.0	0.9	0.5	1.0
Total investment y/y, %	0.1	0.8	-1.4	1.0
Changes in inventories contribution to GDP, pp	0.5	-0.3	-0.4	0.1
Net exports contribution to GDP, pp	-0.3	0.5	1.1	0.0
Inflation (CPI) y/y, %	5.2	4.9	2.0	1.1
Unemployment rate %, France excluding Mayotte	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.6
Budget balance % of GDP	-4.7	-5.5	-6.1	-5.5

Last review: 2023.
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO forecasts on a green background.

Despite a slight slowdown, economic activity continued to grow in France in Q2 2024, up 0.2% after 0.3% in Q1. The mid-year carry-over effect on growth thus stood at 0.9% for 2024.

Third-quarter growth is expected to be strong, boosted by the Olympic and Paralympic Games, ahead of a negative backlash in the fourth quarter. Growth for full-year 2024 will come out at 1.1%, stable compared with the previous year. Growth would be driven primarily by foreign trade and public spending, with private domestic demand (excluding stocks) expected to stagnate. Inflation should fall to an annual average of 2% as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), after 4.9% in 2023. Growth is expected to decline slightly in 2025, to 1%. Growth would then be supported in particular by the increase in household consumption generated by disinflation, with CPI inflation expected to decline to 1.1% on an annual average. Economic activity should also be fuelled by the rebound in private investment owing to the delayed effect of the decrease in key interest rates and structural needs stemming from the digital and ecological transitions. However, foreign trade is not expected to contribute to growth in 2025. Growth would also be adversely impacted by fiscal efforts as public administrations spend slightly less and slow down their investment. The public deficit is expected to reach 6.1% of GDP in 2024 before falling back to 5.5% of GDP in 2025.

THE SCENARIO IN BRIEF

MODEST GROWTH AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

A review of the last few quarters, in which economic activity has slowed while continuing to grow

Economic activity continued to grow in France in second-quarter 2024 but slowed slightly, up 0.2% in volume (qoq) after a 0.3% increase in the first quarter. However, the drivers of this growth proved rather disappointing, with foreign trade and government spending once again playing the starring role. In contrast, household consumption expenditure struggled to gain traction (+0.1%, after -0.1%) despite the ongoing disinflation process. Investment fell for the third quarter in a row (-0.4%, after -0.3%), still affected by the past tightening of financial conditions. The carry-over effect for 2024 growth thus stood at 0.9% at the end of the first half.

Outlook for H2 2024: modest growth on average, with activity boosted in Q3 by the Olympic and Paralympic Games

Economic activity is expected to pick up in the third quarter, with growth forecast at 0.4%, bolstered by the Olympic and Paralympic Summer Games (impact estimated at +0.2 points). Activity is then expected to stagnate at the end of the year (+0%), undermined by the negative backlash of the Games. Our forecast for the third quarter thus corresponds to the latest Banque de France forecast (Monthly Business Survey, early October) and our forecasts for the third and fourth quarters are the same as those published most recently by INSEE (Economic Outlook, October).

Trends in 2024: stable growth, supported by foreign trade and the public sector

Growth is expected to come out at 1.1% in 2024, stable compared with the previous year. Annual growth would be driven primarily by foreign trade and public spending (contributing +1.1 points and +0.4 points respectively), consistent with the mid-year carry-over effect. In contrast, household consumption expenditure should slow, gaining a mere 0.5% in volume in 2024 after 0.9% in 2023, even with inflation expected to fall to 2% on an annual average after 4.9% in 2023. Investment is expected to decrease by 1.4% in 2024, after an increase of 0.8% in 2023. Investment by businesses (-0.9% in 2024 after +2.5% in 2023), and even more so that of households (-5.7% after -8.2%), would continue to be impacted by the past tightening of financial conditions. Destocking at the end of 2023 is also expected to adversely affect growth, by -0.4 points in 2024.

Forecasts for 2025: slightly lower growth concealing a rebound in private domestic demand

Growth is expected to decline slightly in 2025, to +1%. The key growth driver would be household consumption, which is expected to pick up somewhat (to +1%) on gains in purchasing power and continued disinflation. CPI inflation is expected to fall to an annual average of 1.1%. Investment should rebound to +1%, with private investment likely to be driven by the delayed effect of the ECB's key interest rate cut and structural needs stemming from the digital and ecological transitions.

Continued on next page ➔

THE SCENARIO IN BRIEF

MODEST GROWTH AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

Forecasts for 2025: slightly lower growth concealing a rebound in private domestic demand (continued)

Business investment is expected to rebound sharply, to +1.1%, while household investment is expected to rebound more slowly, to +0.6%, undermined by negative carry-over effect at the end of 2024. Foreign trade is expected to make a zero contribution to growth as imports and exports will follow more or less the same trend. Exports should be boosted by continued catch-up in some sectors, including aeronautics, while imports should be buoyed by the rebound in domestic demand. Fiscal efforts will also have a negative impact on growth, as public administration expenditure will decline slightly in volume terms and investment will slow down markedly. The public deficit is expected to fall to 5.5% of GDP in 2025, after reaching 6.1% of GDP in 2024.

Risks

Our forecasts are subject to some uncertainty, given the significant risks both in international developments (geopolitics) and domestic developments (public finances and policy). The risks to economic activity are mainly tilted to the downside. They are reviewed on *p.10*.



Last review: 2023.
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations and forecasts (forecasts on a blue background).

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

SLIGHT ACCELERATION IN THE EUROZONE, SLOWDOWN IN THE US AND CHINA IN 2025

The US economy has proved more resilient than expected, but signs of a slowdown in the labour market in the summer came as a surprise, and even as a cause for concern. As a result, the Fed's subsequent monetary easing was both earlier and stronger than expected, with an initial key-rate cut of 50bp in September 2024. The Fed is expected to make further rate cuts of 50bp in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025 and 25bp in Q2 and Q3 2025. While we no longer expect a slight recession in late-2024/early-2025 (which was the case in the previous scenario), a sharp slowdown is nevertheless afoot, with a modest impact on activity in the eurozone and France around two quarters later (in Q2 and Q3 2025). US economic growth is expected to decline to 1.3% in 2025, after 2.5% in 2024.

Chinese growth is expected to be below the official target of 5%, at 4.7% in 2024 and 4.2% in 2025. This slowdown would result from difficulties in stimulating domestic demand, which should affect demand for goods from the eurozone and France and, hence, their export momentum.

Monetary easing continues in the eurozone, with a second cut in the deposit facility rate by 25bp in September 2024 (after a pause in July) and a tightening of the interest rate corridor. We still expect a 25bp cut every quarter until September 2025. These cuts should support a rebound in investment in the eurozone and France in 2025 after the slump in 2024. Given the slowdown in the two main partner regions (the United States and China), the pick-up in economic activity in the eurozone in 2025 (+1.3%, after +0.8% in 2024) will likely be underpinned by domestic demand, and in particular by the acceleration in household consumption.

International background assumptions

	2023	2024	2025	2023				2024				2025			
				T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4
World GDP (y/y, q/q, %)	3.3	3.0	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
US GDP (y/y, q/q, annualised, %)	2.5	2.5	1.3	2.8	2.5	4.4	3.2	1.6	3.0	1.7	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.7	2.0
Euro area GDP (y/y, q/q, %)	0.5	0.8	1.3	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4
China GDP (y/y, q/q, %)	5.2	4.7	4.2	1.8	0.8	1.5	1.2	1.6	0.6	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0
ECB deposit rate (end of period, %)	4.00	3.25	2.50	3.00	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.50	3.25	3.00	2.75	2.50	2.50
Federal Reserve funds rate (end of period, %)	5.50	4.50	3.50	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.00	4.50	4.00	3.75	3.50	3.50
Exchange rate (average, EUR/USD)	1.08	1.09	1.10	1.07	1.09	1.09	1.08	1.09	1.08	1.10	1.08	1.08	1.09	1.10	1.12
Brent (average, USD/barrel)	82.2	80.9	80.5	82.2	77.9	85.9	83.0	81.9	85.0	78.9	78.0	75.0	80.0	82.0	85.0

Last review: Q3 2024 except GDP (Q2 2024)
Sources: BAE, ECB, Eurostat, IMF, Refinitiv, Federal Reserve, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO forecasts against a green background.

THE SCENARIO IN PICTURES

RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS: MODERATE Q2 GROWTH, IMPROVEMENT UNDER WAY FOR HOUSEHOLDS

Economic activity continued to grow n the second quarter



Last review: Q2 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

The disinflation process continues, with inflation dipping below 2% in August



Last review: September 2024 (provisional)
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

Consumer confidence rebounded this summer



Last review: September 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

The business climate has almost recovered from its July slump (political context)



Last review: September 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

HOUSEHOLDS: CONSUMPTION SET TO ACCELERATE ON GAINS IN WAGE PURCHASING POWER, DESPITE A SLIGHT INCREASE IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

The unemployment rate would rise but should remain much lower than before COVID



Last review: Q2 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO forecasts.

Average wages are slowing but are finally increasing in real terms



NB: Dotted lines show trends in real wages (wages deflated by total CPI).
End-of-quarter data.

Last review: Q2 2024 except minimum wage (SMIC) and CPI (Q3 2024)
Sources: DARES, INSEE, BdF, CA S.A./ECO calculations.

Household purchasing power set to increase significantly by end-2025



Last review: Q2 2024
Sources: INSEE, CA S.A./ECO calculations and forecasts.

Goods consumption fails to return to pre-pandemic level



Last review: Q2 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

THE SCENARIO IN PICTURES

BUSINESSES: INVESTMENT REBOUND NOT EXPECTED BEFORE 2025

NFC financing costs remains high



Last review: August 2024
Sources: Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

NFC investment contracted for the third consecutive quarter in Q2 2024



Last review: Q2 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

The NFC margin rate has decreased slightly but remains comfortable



Last review: Q2 2024
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

RISKS

RISKS TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ARE NOW TILTED TO THE DOWNSIDE

Downside risks to activity

Public finance measures (reduction in public spending, increase in taxes and social security contributions) and macroeconomic knock-on effects

Domestic political developments and potential wait-and-see attitude among households (more savings) and companies (less investment)

Worsening geopolitical tensions

Weak growth among trade partners

Upside risks to activity

Disinflation continues faster than expected

Gains in wage purchasing power

Increase in employment

Household behaviour (fewer savings)
and corporate behaviour (more investment)

Financing conditions ease faster than planned

FOCUS: ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

2025 DRAFT FINANCE BILL: SUBSTANTIAL FISCAL EFFORT, UNDERLYING RISKS

Budget delayed by the political context

On Thursday 10 October, the government presented its Draft Finance Bill for 2025 to the Council of Ministers. On the very same evening, the High Council of Public Finance (*Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques*, HCFP) issued its opinion on the macroeconomic and public finance forecasts forming the basis of the draft bill. However, as the measures still need to be debated in the National Assembly and then in the Senate, the initial text could be extensively reviewed before adoption, expected before the end of December. In theory, the government could use Article 49.3 of the Constitution to push the budget through without a vote. But that may trigger a motion of non-confidence that could overturn it (in which case, no budget).

"Optimistic" macroeconomic forecasts for 2025

The government expects GDP growth of 1.1% in volume in 2024 and 1.1% in 2025 (sa-wda[(1)]), the same as in 2023. While the broad consensus now is on 1.1% for 2024, the 1.1% growth forecast in 2025 may seem slightly optimistic given the scale of the planned adjustments to public finances. CPI inflation is expected to fall to 2.1% on an annual average this year (after 4.9% in 2023) and to 1.8% in 2025. The government's inflation forecast for 2025 appears fairly high given that inflation fell to 1.2% year-on-year in September according to provisional INSEE results and a decrease of around 10% in regulated electricity sales tariffs is expected in February 2025. In comparison, our inflation forecast for 2025 is 1.1%. The HCFP has referred to the government's macroeconomic scenario for 2025 as "fragile". The high inflation forecast is reflected in the GDP deflator and inflates the government's GDP growth forecast in value terms (to +2.9%, compared with our forecast of +2.3%). As GDP in value terms is the metric used to calculate the government's deficit and debt ratios, this denominator effect serves to lower the expected ratios as a percentage of GDP.

Further public deficit slippage in 2024, substantial efforts required in 2025

The government expects a deficit of 6.1% of GDP in 2024, significantly outstripping the 4.4% expected in the 2024 Draft Finance Bill in autumn 2023 and considerably higher than the 5.1% forecast in the stability programme in spring 2024. This figure constitutes further slippage in public finances, similar to that in 2023, when the public deficit came out at 5.5% of GDP compared with an autumn 2023 forecast of 4.9%. This year, the reason is higher-than-expected spending (particularly by local authorities) and slightly lower-than-expected revenues. No amending finance bill (PLFR) was passed this year to secure savings, despite the announced drift. The government expects to reduce the public deficit to 5% of GDP in 2025. This will call for substantial efforts given that, without corrective measures, the deficit could well increase to around 7% of GDP by the end of next year.

Two-thirds of measures focused on controlling spending

The plan to save €60.6bn in public finances in 2025 (as a deviation from the trend without measures) is based primarily on spending, with €41.3bn in savings planned. Half of these savings will concern the state, with cuts likely in ministry headcounts. State operators are also expected to contribute €1.5bn to the savings effort. With regard to other government bodies, the social security system is a key focus, accounting for one-third of the expenditure effort with €14.8bn in planned savings. The national healthcare spending target (ONDAM) determined in the social security finance bill (PLFSS) for 2025 will be increased by just 2.8% next year, compared with 3.2% this year, for €3.8bn in savings.

Continued on next page ➔

(1) Data adjusted for seasonal variations and working days effects.

FOCUS: ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

2025 DRAFT FINANCE BILL: SUBSTANTIAL FISCAL EFFORT, UNDERLYING RISKS

Two-thirds of measures focused on controlling spending (continued)

Retirees will also contribute to the fiscal effort, with the revaluation of retirement pensions on past inflation, which usually occurs on 1st January, now postponed to 1st July (€3.6bn). Businesses are concerned, too, with a €4.7bn reduction in social and tax expenses in their favour, including a €4bn reduction in burden relief on low-wage earners. Last but not least, local authorities are expected to save some €5bn, and mechanisms should be introduced binding them to do so.

One-third of the measures will consist of an increase in revenues

The increase in taxes is expected to generate €19.3bn in additional revenue for public administrations in 2025. Businesses will contribute the lion's share (€13.6bn), with an exceptional corporate tax surcharge for the largest companies (300 companies with annual revenue of over €1bn should be concerned, with an expected €8bn in revenues in 2025) and the continuation of the corporate value added tax (CVAE), which was expected to be axed (€1.1bn). The government also intends to introduce "green" taxes, with more stringent penalties for vehicles with lower environmental standards (€0.3bn) and revised measures increasing taxation on airline tickets and fossil fuels (€1.5bn). Taxes on households are expected to increase by €5.7bn. The wealthiest households are expected to contribute to the effort (to the tune of €2bn) through a measure supposedly concerning just 0.3% of French taxpayers based on a trigger threshold of €500,000 in annual income for a household without children. However, the government has ruled out a freeze on the income tax scale. Households will also contribute through an increase in the excise duty on electricity prices (€3bn).

Behind this ambitious consolidation drive, there are risks to the macroeconomic scenario

The government's public finance forecasts for 2025 appear somewhat ambitious, with the public deficit to be reduced to 5% of GDP. The objectives on expenditure savings and the corresponding increases in taxes are considerable. The danger is that actually meeting these objectives will negatively impact growth, but the most obvious risk is that these targets will simply not be reached. Having weighted these risks, **we expect growth to be slightly lower than forecast by the government next year (1%). We expect a substantial reduction in the deficit, but less than that expected by the government, to 5.5% of GDP in 2025 (after 6.1% in 2024), with what we see as a more realistic inflation forecast**.

France is required to submit its medium-term trajectory on public finances to the European Commission at the end of October[(1)]. According to this trajectory, which has been submitted to the HCFP, the public deficit will fall to below 3% in 2029. In an opinion issued on 10 October, the HCFP considers that the government has failed to provide sufficient information on its underlying macroeconomic forecasts and how it intends to reduce the deficit over this horizon. The government responded by saying it had made a commitment to the European Commission on this trajectory. What is true is that some of the measures in the 2025 Finance Bill are clearly temporary, including the corporate tax surcharge on large companies and the minimum tax on the wealthiest households (planned for two years and gradually eliminated in the second year).

(1) France was initially due to submit its plan on 20 September like other EU countries but obtained an extension given the political context.

FOCUS: ORANGE ALERT ON PUBLIC FINANCES

2025 DRAFT FINANCE BILL: SUBSTANTIAL FISCAL EFFORT, UNDERLYING RISKS

The government is forecasting growth of 1.1% in 2024 and 2025, and then expects growth to be higher than potential until 2028, when the output gap will close



Last review: 2023.
Sources: INSEE, government forecasts (2025 Draft Finance Bill and 2025-2028 Fiscal and Structural Medium-Term Plan), High Council of Public Finance (HCFP), Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

According to the government's trajectory, public debt will peak in 2027, at 116.5% of GDP, then fall slightly, remaining above 110% of GDP in 2031



Last review: 2023.
Sources: INSEE, government forecasts (2025 Draft Finance Bill and 2025-2028 Fiscal and Structural Medium-Term Plan), High Council of Public Finance (HCFP), Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO.

FOCUS: COMPANY DEFAULTS

RISE IN DEFAULTS TO BE PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE

The increase in defaults results from catch-up combined with numerous business creations

The number of corporate defaults has increased considerably since 2022. But the trend results primarily from normalisation and catch-up, after a period when company failures were particularly thin on the ground (2020-2021). The large-scale public support implemented during the health crisis protected companies in a relatively uniform manner, regardless of their economic viability, and changes in procedures may also have served to delay insolvency declarations. The rise in the number of business failures can also be explained by the economic slowdown after the post-Covid economic recovery. Lastly, business creation momentum has been extremely strong since the health crisis, contributing to the increase in the number of insolvencies through a size effect. This concomitance between many defaults and numerous births of companies is a positive development, demonstrating the renewal of the productive fabric through a certain form of creative destruction, with the most productive and innovative companies surviving.

Stabilisation seems to be on the cards

According to provisional figures from the Banque de France, at end-September 2024 the number of business defaults in the preceding 12 months amounted to 63,741. This is 7.4% higher than the 2010-2019 average (59,342), and considerably higher than the number in 2019 (53,242, i.e. +19.7%), but it does show a certain stabilisation in the last three months (63,493 in July 2024, i.e. +0.4%). By company size, the increase in insolvencies over 12 months compared with 2010-2019 mainly concerns intermediate-sized enterprises and large companies (+90.9%, supposedly concerning ISEs) and, to a lesser extent, small companies (+65.8%), very small companies (+64.2%) and medium-sized companies (+56.7%). The increase in business failures was less pronounced among micro-enterprises and companies of indefinite size (+4.1% year-on-year at end-September compared with the 2010-2019 average).

Fairly favourable business entry/exit momentum

Because data on the stock of companies is available with a significant time lag, it cannot be used to analyse recent developments. But other data on company demographics may be used. Comparing defaults (part of exits) and business births (entries) is particularly useful. The Banque de France's methodology[1] can be used to compare the number of creations and the number of failures and study the trend in this relationship over time.

- Using the creation of companies excluding micro-entrepreneurs, the ratio of the number of creations to the number of failures was 6.5 in the first eight months of 2024 (on average over 12 months). This is lower than at end-2019 (7.2 in December on average over 12 months) but higher than the 12-month average between 2016 and 2019 (6.1). ➔ That shows that entry/exit momentum is not particularly unfavourable.

- Using total business creations (including micro-entrepreneurs), the ratio of the number of births to the number of failures in the first eight months of 2024 comes out at 18.1 (on average over 12 months). This is higher than at end-2019 (16.9 in December on average over 12 months) and higher than the average over 12 months between 2016 and 2019 (12.4). ➔ Business entry/exit momentum is therefore extremely favourable when including micro-entrepreneurs.

(1) See Banque de France Bulletin 248/6 of September-October 2023.

FOCUS: COMPANY DEFAULTS

RISE IN DEFAULTS TO BE PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE

The rise in defaults is affecting all business sectors to a varying extent…



Last review: September 2024

Sources: Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

… defaults are increasing more among ISEs and small and medium-sized businesses



Last review: September 2024

Sources: Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

The number of business creations has been particularly high since 2020



Last review: August 2024

Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

Fairly favourable business entry/exit momentum (creation/default ratio)



Last review: August 2024

Sources: INSEE, Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations.

NB: The comparison with the COVID period is misleading, as the sharp increase in the ratio is linked to the considerable decrease in the number of company defaults during the health crisis.

THE SCENARIO IN FIGURES

THE FORECAST IN DETAIL

France Scenario – October 2024
Modest growth against the backdrop of an orange alert on public finances

	2022	2023	2024	2025	2023				2024				2025			
					T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4
GDP volume, sa-wda y/y, q/q, %	2.6	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4
Domestic demand excl. inventories contribution to GDP, pp	2.4	0.9	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	-0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3
Household consumption y/y, q/q, %	3.0	0.9	0.5	1.0	0.2	-0.1	0.6	0.2	-0.1	0.1	0.5	-0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Public consumption y/y, q/q, %	2.6	0.8	1.5	-0.3	-0.3	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Total investment y/y, q/q, %	0.1	0.8	-1.4	1.0	-0.2	0.5	0.0	-1.0	-0.5	-0.4	-0.2	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7
Changes in inventories contribution to GDP, pp	0.5	-0.3	-0.4	0.1	-0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.6	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net exports contribution to GDP, pp	-0.3	0.5	1.1	0.0	0.1	0.5	-0.1	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Exports y/y, q/q, %	8.4	2.5	2.1	1.8	-1.3	3.0	-1.2	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4
Imports y/y, q/q, %	9.1	0.7	-1.4	1.8	-1.6	1.5	-0.8	-2.2	-0.4	0.1	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3
Inflation (CPI) y/y, %	5.2	4.9	2.0	1.1	6.0	5.2	4.7	3.7	2.8	2.2	1.8	1.2	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.4
Inflation (HICP) y/y, %	5.9	5.7	2.3	1.1	7.0	6.1	5.5	4.2	3.0	2.5	2.1	1.5	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.3
Unemployment rate France excl. Mayotte, %	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.6	7.1	7.2	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.3	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.4	7.5	7.7
Taux de chômage Metropolitan France, %	7.1	7.1	7.3	7.3	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.2	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.2	7.4
Budget balance % of GDP	-4.7	-5.5	-6.1	-5.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Public debt % of GDP	111.2	109.9	112.9	116.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Last review: Q2 2024 except inflation (Q3 2024)
Sources: INSEE, Crédit Agricole S.A./ECO calculations and forecasts (forecasts on a green background).

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