

### Pierre Benadjaoud

### FRANCE 2023-2024 SCENARIO

# THE ECONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES OF INFLATION

January 2023



### **Summary**

- 2 **Recent trends in activity**
- 3 Our scenario for 2022-2023
- 4 Focus - The financial health of NFCs and default risks

#### **SUMMARY**

#### SHORT-TERM UNCERTAINTIES AND STRUCTURAL COMPETITIVENESS LOSSES

Although the rise in energy prices exacerbated by the war in Ukraine – is partly cushioned by public support measures and the "tariff shield", it is negatively impacting the French economy, household's purchasing power and business income and its total cost in 2022 is expected to reach 1.5 points of GDP. These effects on income will lead to a slowdown in demand at the end of 2022 and early 2023, at which point a contraction in GDP is not ruled out. But thanks to a significant growth overhang, GDP growth is expected to reach 2.6% in 2022. Inflation is expected to peak at the beginning of 2023 but will remain high. ebbing only gradually over the year. Coupled with aggressive monetary tightening, which will ultimately restrict investment, with most companies' margins already under pressure, economic activity is expected to pick up only slowly in the second half of the year, and some industrial sectors will remain impacted by high energy prices on a more lasting basis. Growth is expected to reach 0.3% in 2023. In 2024, the recovery in activity is expected to remain moderate and energy prices to remain high, leading to a lasting deterioration in Europe's competitiveness compared with other geographical regions. Growth will be around 1%, still below its long-term potential.

This scenario continues to be based on strong assumptions on energy supply and prices. If winter power outages now seem more unlikely with the resumption of production at nuclear power plants and favourable weather, natural-gas supply difficulties will persist failing a short-term solution to the conflict in Ukraine. In addition, strikes could be organised at the beginning of the year as the French government presents its already unpopular pension reform.

#### Main components of the scenario:

- Household consumption is expected to slow in 2023. After a rebound in purchasing power in the second half of 2022, real household income should contract once again in 2023, while inflation and the deterioration in the economy will encourage caution on the part of households. A gradual recovery is expected starting in second-half 2023.
- Corporate investment is also projected to slow in 2023 after proving particularly strong in 2022. Stimulus plan loans are down slightly, margins have slipped in most sectors, and financing conditions are less favourable.
- Inflation will continue to affect purchasing power and corporate margins in 2023. But after peaking in early 2023, inflation is expected to slow down as energy prices stabilise at a high level. The French government has renewed its tariff shield, which will cushion part of the price increase in 2023, though the impact

- on the inflation rate will be more modest than in 2022. The shield is expected to be at least partially extended in 2024.
- Fiscal policies to support purchasing power come at a significant cost to public finances and the public deficit will remain high in 2022 and 2023, even after the end of the emergency measures implemented during the health crisis. The cost of the tariff shield is estimated at €48.6bn for 2022 and is expected to be slightly higher in 2023.
- The trade balance is expected to drag on growth in 2022. Although the expected pick-up in the aviation business could support exports in 2023, the cost competitiveness of France and Europe is deteriorated by persistently high energy prices.
- Labour market momentum is expected to remain strong. But the unemployment rate could rise slightly, as job creations are expected to slow and bankruptcies forecast to return to pre-crisis levels.



#### **SUMMARY**


#### **COLD SNAP ON GROWTH AND A HESITANT RECOVERY**

#### Main numbers of our outlook

2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
-7,9	6,8	2,6	0,3	1,0
-6,8	5,2	2,3	0,2	1,3
-8,4	11,3	2,1	0,0	1,2
-8,0	11,8	3,2	1,1	1,4
-0,2	-0,3	0,8	0,2	-0,2
-1,0	0,0	-0,6	-0,2	0,0
7,8	7,7	7,1	7,5	7,7
0,5	1,6	5,2	5,3	2,9
-9,0	-6,5	-5,1	-5,5	-5,2
	-7,9 -6,8 -8,4 -8,0 -0,2 -1,0 7,8 0,5	-7,9 6,8 -6,8 5,2 -8,4 11,3 -8,0 11,8 -0,2 -0,3 -1,0 0,0 7,8 7,7 0,5 1,6	-7,9 6,8 2,6 -6,8 5,2 2,3 -8,4 11,3 2,1 -8,0 11,8 3,2 -0,2 -0,3 0,8 -1,0 0,0 -0,6 7,8 7,7 7,1 0,5 1,6 5,2	-7,9 6,8 2,6 0,3 -6,8 5,2 2,3 0,2 -8,4 11,3 2,1 0,0 -8,0 11,8 3,2 1,1 -0,2 -0,3 0,8 0,2 -1,0 0,0 -0,6 -0,2 7,8 7,7 7,1 7,5 0,5 1,6 5,2 5,3

Quarterly growth (q/q, %)															
	2020				20	2021			2022			2023			
T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4	T1	T2	T3	T4
-5,5	-13,5	18,3	-0,9	0,1	1,1	3,3	0,6	-0,2	0,5	0,2	0,0	-0,3	0,1	0,4	0,2
-5,3	-11,5	18,3	-5,4	0,4	1,2	5,6	0,5	-1,2	0,4	-0,1	-0,3	-0,1	0,2	0,5	0,3
-9,5	-14,2	23,7	2,5	0,9	2,2	0,0	-0,1	0,5	0,5	1,7	-0,4	-0,7	-0,1	0,2	0,3
-9,0	-14,1	24,0	1,9	1,8	2,0	-0,1	0,1	0,6	0,9	3,0	-0,4	-0,4	0,1	0,2	0,3
0.62	0.39	-1.83	0.63	0.32	-0.29	-0.71	0.64	0.11	0.41	0.27	0,0	-0,1	-0,1	0,1	-0,1
-0,3	-1,5	0,4	0,9	-0,5	0,1	0,3	-0,6	0,1	-0,3	-0,6	0,1	0,0	0,1	-0,1	0,0
7,6	7,0	8,8	7,8	8,0	7,7	7,8	7,2	7,1	7,2	7,1	7,1	7,3	7,5	7,5	7,5
1,2	0,3	0,3	0,1	0,7	1,4	1,7	2,7	3,7	5,3	5,8	6,1	6,4	5,4	4,9	4,3

Source: Crédit Agricole SA/ECO, forecast



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO



<sup>\*</sup> Contributions to GDP growth


- **Summary**
- **Recent trends in activity**
- 3 Our scenario for 2022-2023
- Focus The financial health of NFCs and default risks



#### RECENT TRENDS IN ACTIVITY

#### **INVESTMENT BOLSTERS GROWTH IN Q3**


#### **GDP** growth and contributions



Though still significantly lower than before the crisis, automotive production has recovered in part in recent months thanks to the easing of some supply constraints. Activity in the sector has long been curbed by the shortage of semiconductors. But demand has remained strong, and business investment in transport equipment increased sharply in the third quarter, driving overall GDP growth.

At the same time, after a rebound in the consumption of services in Q2, household consumption slowed. The consumption of services continued to increase, but at a slower pace, while the consumption of goods began to decline on the back of inflationary pressures. We expect a further decline in household consumption in Q4.

# Investment of NFCs by item (Q4 2019: 100)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO


By sector, transport equipment manufacturing posted the strongest growth in Q3, although it is still 30% lower than before the crisis.

We expect economic activity to stagnate in Q4. Inflationary pressures are weighing on household consumption and industrial production is expected to decline, impacted in particular by strikes at refineries in October and suspensions of business activity in highly energy-intensive sectors affected by rising energy prices (including aluminium foundries and glassworks).

#### RECENT TRENDS IN ACTIVITY

#### **ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE DECLINES, TOWARDS DEMAND CONSTRAINTS?**

#### **Business climate and consumer confidence**




Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

Business confidence has deteriorated slightly but remained stable over the past few months close to its historical average, both in services and manufacturing. Companies long subject to supply constraints – including shortages of intermediate goods, rising commodity and energy prices and longer supply times – are starting to report a certain slowdown in demand. Order books are a little less full than a few months ago, but at this point the deterioration in the economic climate is not brutal.

The wait-and-see attitude relative to demand is reflected in household economic surveys. Consumer confidence has been more stable in

# Companies whose activity is limited by supply shortages (%)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

recent months but fell sharply in 2022. Rising prices have bred uncertainty among households as to their future financial situation, prompting caution. They are reluctant to make major purchases, the great majority of them preferring instead to save. Unemployment fears have also mounted in recent months, but job creation momentum has so far shown no signs of weakness.




- **Summary**
- 2 **Recent trends in activity**
- Our scenario for 2022-2023
- Focus The financial health of NFCs and default risks



#### GROWTH BELOW POTENTIAL OVER THE MEDIUM TERM

### Electricity production of the French nuclear fleet



NB: the decrease at the end of December 2022 resulted from extremely mild temperatures for the season, production capacities remaining present.

Sources: RTE, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

#### **Quarterly GDP**



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

The assumptions for our scenario have changed fairly little since our October publication, and the prospect of forced energy rationing appears to be receding. First, efforts to reduce energy consumption seem to be bearing fruit despite the cold snap in early December. Second, the use of natural gas stocks is lower than in previous years (mild weather) and inventories were particularly high at the end of the autumn. Though a part of these energy savings results from suspensions of activity in energy-intensive industrial sectors having failed to cope with the rise in prices, consumption is also down in the tertiary sector and among households. Lastly, despite delays, several nuclear reactors have been brought back on line in recent weeks. Nuclear generation capacity, which has been much lower than average throughout the year, is now close to levels seen in previous years, while production at other reactors is planned to start up again in January.


As a result, after a peak in inflation in early 2023 and a likely contraction in activity in Q4 2022/Q1 2023, growth is expected to pick up slightly starting in Q2. But it will remain below its potential rate. Inflation will decline throughout the year but remain high and above wage growth, which will undermine household purchasing power and consumption. In addition, the European Central Bank will continue its monetary tightening. Four more rate hikes are expected in 2023 and the start of quantitative tightening will reduce liquidity inflows on the bond markets. This will lead to increasing financing costs, while investment is also expected to slow significantly, despite a fiscal policy that continues to support the economy.

More structurally, the competitiveness of France and, more broadly, the eurozone has slipped substantially. Although inflation is expected to slow in 2023 and 2024 with the gradual disappearance of some base effects, energy prices will to remain high on a lasting basis failing a resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. With energy more expensive than in other major geographical areas, the price of European imports is rising, increasing the production costs of businesses and eroding their competitiveness relative to companies in, for example, the United States and Asia. This competitiveness deficit is expected to negatively impact the medium-term growth outlook and partly explain the sluggish recovery in activity in second-half 2023 and in 2024.



#### CONSUMPTION: WEAKER DEMAND AND DECLINE IN PURCHASING POWER


#### **Growth in purchasing power and contributions**



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

Driven by a favourable growth overhang and an increase in the consumption of services in Q2, household consumption is expected to rise 2.3% in 2022. Though favourable at first glance, this figure conceals a sharp slowdown since Q3. Inflation is weighing on household consumption, and the consumption of goods has already started to decline. Despite the tariff shield and the French law on purchasing power, household purchasing power is expected to be virtually stable in 2022 (and down slightly in terms of purchasing power per consumption unit, i.e. taking into account population growth). This macroeconomic stability conceals disparities, with on one side the pegging of the minimum wage to inflation and the revaluation of social benefits (particularly pensions), and on the other side a more moderate trend in most wages. The tariff shield will be largely maintained in 2023,

# Consumer confidence (normalised balance of opinion)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO


continuing to limit inflationary pressures, but purchasing power is expected to further contract. The labour market is expected to be less dynamic and wage growth will once again be lower than price growth. Overall, household consumption is expected to be virtually stable in 2023 (+0.2%) and increase 1.3% in 2024.

Moreover, households remain cautious and consumer confidence has plummeted since the beginning of the year as a result of inflationary pressures. Unemployment fears have also been on the rise in the last few months, though relatively contained thus far.



#### PRICE INCREASES MAKE A HOLE IN SURPLUS SAVINGS


#### Household savings rate



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

After two quarters of decline, the savings rate rebounded in Q3 thanks to the increase in purchasing power enabled by the revaluation of the public service index and social benefits. Households have once again confirmed their cautious leanings by preferring not to consume this surplus income. The savings rate should increase once again in Q4 as the elimination of the television licence fee helps to boost household purchasing power. But household purchasing power is expected to contract from Q1 2023 onwards. With inflation still high, households will dip into their savings for essential purchases and the savings rate will decline gradually, returning to 15%, close to the pre-COVID average. While some households have already spent the savings

# Quarterly flows of gross household savings (€bn)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO


surplus built up during the pandemic, others will remain be cautious.

During periods of high inflation and uncertainty, households tend to hold on to the purchasing value of their savings to meet future essential future spending, rather than focus on a particular target amount. As inflation eats away at the value of savings, households are encouraged to put more aside, even if this means pulling back on current spending (especially on non-essential goods and services) to ensure they have enough aside for essential purchases in the future.



#### **INFLATION IS PEAKING BUT WILL REMAIN HIGH IN 2023**


# Producer Price Index (PPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole SA / ECO

While the import price increase of industrial products is still above 20% year-on-year, consumer price inflation stood at 6.2% in November and 5.9% in December, a sign that the repercussion of the increase in production costs on sales prices is partial for now and happening gradually. As such, though inflation appears to have peaked several months ago on intermediate goods prices, and while some supply tensions are now easing, consumer price inflation will remain high in 2023. We expect a peak of around 7% in early 2023, followed by a gradual decline. After reaching 5.2% in 2022, inflation is expected to average 5% in 2023. While the tariff shield on energy prices will largely be renewed (with the increase in gas and electricity prices capped at 15% in 2023), rising energy prices are no longer expected to be the main driver of inflation. In 2022, the tariff shield reduced the increase in

#### Inflation and contributions




Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole SA/ ECO

consumer prices in France by 2.2 points, largely explaining the inflation gap between France and other European countries. But the shield will not be as effective in containing inflation in 2023, with an average impact estimated at around 1.5%.

Food prices now stand as the greatest burden on consumer budgets, accounting for 18% of total household consumption of goods and services. With low-income households spending more on food, and also having a higher propensity to consume (share of income spent on consumption), they will likely be obliged to reduce non-essential spending as purchasing power contracts.


#### INVESTMENT LANDING RISK

#### **NFC** profit margin rates



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

By passing on only a part of the increase in the price of intermediate and commodity goods to their sales prices, companies are under pressure on their margins. The margin rate of non-financial companies was around 32% before COVID. After a slight decline in 2020, the margin rate rebounded sharply in 2021, exceeding 34%. Corporate financing capacity was also particularly high, reaching €40bn in 2021 and contributing to the sharp rebound in investment. Since the start of 2022, the margin rate has gradually contracted, to below 32% (a result in particular of substantial wage increases and the decline in support measures). This slowdown is affecting most sectors of the economy but is particularly marked in sectors struggling to return to pre-crisis levels, such as automotive (and, more broadly, transport equipment production), and in sectors having benefited considerably from support during the health crisis, including hotels and restaurants.




Sources: Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

Furthermore, although real rates today remain negative (with interest rates below inflation), the tightening of interest rates should contribute to a sharp slowdown in business investment. Inflation initially pushed down real interest rates. Following the monetary tightening initiated by central banks and the likely slowdown in inflation starting in 2023, we expect real interest rates to increase. This will restrict access to financing for companies. Investment by NFCs is thus expected to increase 3% in 2022 but a clear slowdown is expected in 2023 despite a favourable growth overhang. NFC growth is forecast at 1.1% in 2023 and 1.4% in 2024.




#### DETERIORATION IN TERMS OF TRADE AND LOSS OF COMPETITIVENESS



Sources: Douanes, Crédit Agricole SA/ ECO

France's trade balance in goods has deteriorated in recent months as the prices of imported goods (particularly energy) have risen faster than those of exports. The trend has also been driven by the appreciation of the dollar against the euro. Overall, foreign trade is expected to contribute -0.6% points to GDP growth in 2022. In addition, despite a dip in demand from other European countries and a downward revision to our growth forecasts, French exports, by their nature, could be in a slightly better position compared with those of Germany and Italy. The end of zero-COVID policies in Asia will make it possible for some tourists to return to France and the expected



Sources: Douanes, Crédit Agricole SA/ ECO

production recovery in 2023 in the aviation sector – one of France's main trade surpluses – could contribute to the improvement of the trade balance in goods.

Nevertheless, Europe's cost competitiveness is declining on a lasting basis, with the price of imported goods, and energy in particular, increasing more than in other regions owing to the war in Ukraine. This could hurt French and European exports in the longer term.

#### MIGHT UNEMPLOYMENT EDGE UP?


# Unemployment rate (mainland France)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

The unemployment rate in metropolitan France remained stable this year, around 7.2%. It is expected to hold steady in Q4 2022 and remain lower than before the health crisis (7.9% in Q4 2019). Hiring intentions are high in most sectors, but they could decline as employment has picked up faster than economic activity since the end of the lockdowns. However, the unemployment rate could increase slightly at the end of the year and in 2023, since corporate bankruptcies, though still moderate, are on the rise and expected to swiftly return to pre-crisis levels (see slide 18). Defaults mainly

### Hiring intentions (normalised indicators)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

concern very small and young companies and there is no expected wave of bankruptcies for the time being. But this could lead to job losses and hiring could slow as a result of the expected slowdown in economic activity at the start of 2023. The unemployment rate in metropolitan France is expected to average 7.1% in 2022 and rise to 7.5% in 2023 and 7.7% in 2024.


- **Summary**
- 2 Recent trends in activity
- 3 Our scenario for 2022-2023
- Focus The financial health of NFCs and default risks



#### **FOCUS - NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES**

#### PUBLIC SUPPORT STILL IN PLACE


#### Subsidies and investment aids to NFCs



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

The rebound in investment was facilitated by the introduction of aid in the midst of the pandemic. Taking the form of exemptions and deferrals of social security contributions and taxes or the implementation of short-time work, government aid relieved the pressure on corporate cash flow during activity stoppages. With support for the recovery, including the France Relance and France 2030 plans, targeted investment aid also increased, rising from €14bn in 2019 to €25bn in 2021 according to the accounts of companies released by the Insee (national statistics institute). Thus, while targeted investment support is expected to slow slightly after particularly high levels in 2021, it will remain durably higher than before the COVID crisis. The amounts committed as part of the France Relance and France 2030 plans will be paid out over several years.

# Mandatory contributions ((social security contributions + production taxes + corporate tax)/VA)



Sources: Insee, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO


Looking beyond targeted investment aid, mandatory levies on companies have declined since 2013 and the implementation of the CICE tax credit for employment and competitiveness. In addition to the CICE, which costs around €20bn per year and was transformed into a sustainable reduction in charges in 2019, social security contributions on low wages have decreased and production taxes have declined substantially. Corporate tax was also reduced from 33.3% in 2017 to 25% in 2022. While these measures are costly and their effectiveness is often called into question (particularly in terms of their impact on employment and investment), they nevertheless help to improve the cost competitiveness of French companies and their financing capacities. This is particularly true for industrial companies, which are the primary beneficiaries of lower production taxes.



#### **FOCUS - NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES**

#### RISING BANKRUPTCIES, RISK OF SLIPPAGE

#### **Corporate failures (monthly)**




Sources: Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

In macroeconomic terms, companies still have a fairly large cash buffer and could dip into these reserves to address increasing cash requirements or deleverage to adjust to rising interest rates. With the end of the aid put in place during the pandemic, companies are once again responsible for all their wage costs and also have to repay certain social security contributions and taxes as well as stateguaranteed loans. In sector terms, the consensus among business leaders on their cash position remains at historically high levels but has deteriorated slightly in the last few months owing to the rise in production costs and the other cash requirements discussed earlier. This is particularly true among SMEs in the manufacturing sector.

**Defaults have risen sharply since the beginning of 2022.** With the end of support measures and the resumption of receivership

#### Balance of opinion on cash position



Sources: Banque de France, Crédit Agricole S.A. / ECO

procedures, nearly 10,000 defaults were registered in Q2 2022, up 49% year-on-year but still 20% lower than in Q2 2019 (pre-COVID). At this stage, we expect a return to normal for next year rather than a wave of defaults. Cash reserves remain abundant and have yet to be eaten into, which should bolster the resilience of businesses in the coming months despite lower profitability. Nevertheless, close attention will need to be paid to the escalation of defaults in the coming quarters, as the number of bankruptcies could quickly return to pre-crisis levels. With the upcoming slowdown in economic activity, those levels could even be exceeded in some sectors, particularly those with cash flow difficulties or rapidly eroding margins, such as hotels and restaurants.



#### **CONSULT OUR LAST FREE PUBLICATIONS ON-LINE**

Date	Title	Theme
10/01/2023	Germany – 2023-2024 scenario: towards a brief and limited recession!	Germany
19/12/2022	World – Macro-economic Scenario 2023-2024: an unprecedented reversal	World
19/12/2022	Geo-economics – The new role of second-tier powers	Geo-economics
13/12/2022	France – Investment and financial health of companies	France
01/12/2022	COP27: a first step towards climate justice	Sub-Saharan Africa
18/11/2022	Remote consultations in France: an answer to medical deserts?	Sector
09/11/2022	Eurozone – 2022-2023 scenario: an immediate, lasting and doubly asymmetric competitive shock	Eurozone
09/11/2022	Spain – 2022-2023 Scenario: growth expected to moderate	Spain
09/11/2022	Italy – 2022-2023 Scenario: avoiding the perfect storm	Italy
03/11/2022	What America is telling us about its strategy	World
03/11/2022	Germany – 2022-2023 Scenario: sobriety, a small price to pay!	Eurozone
27/10/2022	How does a nuclear reactor work?	Sector
24/10/2022	Geopolitics – Time for choices	Geopolitics
21/10/2022	Can European funds change the course of democracy?	Europe
17/10/2022	France – 2022-2023 Scenario: the economy and the challenges of inflation	France
13/10/2022	France – 2023 Draft Budget Bill: A public deficit stabilised against a backdrop of crises	France





Pierre BENADJAOUD +33 1 43 23 97 36 **\** 







Access and subscribe to our free online publications: application available in <a href="App Store">App Store</a> and in <a href="Google Play">Google Play</a>

Crédit Agricole S.A. — Group Economic Research 12 place des Etats-Unis – 92127 Montrouge Cedex

Publication Manager: Isabelle Job-Bazille - Chief Editor: Armelle Sarda Information centre: Dominique Petit - Statistics: Alexis Mayer, Jorge Mariano Mamani Soria

Editor: Véronique Champion
Contact: publication.eco@credit-agricole-sa.fr

This publication reflects the opinion of Crédit Agricole S.A. on the date of publication, unless otherwise specified (in the case of outside contributors). Such opinion is subject to change without notice. This publication is provided for informational purposes only. The information and analyses contained herein are not to be construed as an offer to sell or as a

change without notice. This publication is provided for informational purposes only. The information and analyses contained herein are not to be construed as an offer to sell or as a solicitation whatsoever. Crédit Agricole S.A. and its affiliates shall not be responsible in any manner for direct, indirect, special or consequential damages, however caused, arising therefrom. Crédit Agricole does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such opinions, nor of the sources of information upon which they are based, although such sources of information are considered reliable. Crédit Agricole S.A. or its affiliates therefore shall not be responsible in any manner for direct, indirect, special or consequential damages,

however caused, arising from the disclosure or use of the information contained in this publication.