

Perspectives

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GEOPOLITICS – Emotional warfare permeates us all: we should learn to understand it

“From now on, when battle is done in any part of the world, nothing will be easier than ensuring the sound of gunfire is heard throughout the whole earth [...]. However, one day we will undoubtedly have at our disposal resources that are more powerful and a little more subtle, enabling us to remotely affect not only people's senses but even the hidden depths of their psyches.” – Paul Valéry, Regards sur le monde actuel, Gallimard, 1945

- Public opinion has always been one of the battlefields in power struggles. Now, though, thanks to a combination of geopolitical uncertainty and the “infobesity” (information overload) of what Joseph Nye called the Information Age¹, the role of public opinion is strategically more important. **Who gets to decide who the enemy is? Governments or public opinion? The Global North or the Global South? Who will craft the new consensus in this in-between time when “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”?² Who will define the issues that lead to clashes and division? Who will determine what constitutes an event and what does not?**
- This “in-between” political situation is now well understood by the people of the world: although still a superpower, the US is no longer a hegemon that can on its own ensure the stability of the international system. What is perhaps less well understood, however, is just how important a role political narratives will play in shaping the overall political scenario as soon as models previously seen as authoritative (in this instance democracy) are called into question and alternative proposals come to the fore. **The emergence of the Global South, in particular, is not just a matter of GDP or currency but of counternarratives and new forms of soft power.**
- It is against this backdrop that the frontiers of information warfare are being pushed back to include emotional warfare. **Drawing on a combination of cognitive science and new technology, influence operations are now able to target deeply embedded layers of our identity:** the aim is no longer merely to cast doubt on what is true or false but to redirect our emotions, our beliefs, our values and our decision-making capability. After the land, the air, the oceans, space and cyberspace, the battle is now for our minds³: welcome to the sixth war and the murky world of cognitive warfare.
- These conflicts affect both individuals and societies, since emotions are upstream of economics and politics: “emotions precede feelings” and are “the natural way for the brain and the mind to evaluate the environment both within and outside the organism”.⁴ So cognitive warfare affects all of us: as individuals, as a collective, and as consumers and investors. **It is our emotions that shape the trade-offs and choices we make.**
- In these destabilisation campaigns, we are targets, victims and actors. And **it would be a mistake to believe we can escape them, especially since one of the levers of influence is belief in one's own self-immunity.** The well-known parable talks about specks and beams in our eyes; psychologists now talk about cognitive bias and the irrationality⁵ of people who nevertheless see themselves as rational. **The more a**

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, 2004

² Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Volume 1, Notebook 3 (1930), Columbia University Press, 1992

³ Bernard Claverie, What Is Cognition? Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance, NATO, 2022

⁴ Antonio R. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, Mariner Books, 2003

⁵ Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Penguin, 2012

target downplays their fragility, the more susceptible to cognitive attack they will be. As Baudelaire wrote, “The devil’s finest trick is to persuade you that he doesn’t exist”⁶

- Speaking of the devil, one of the ways cognitive manipulation works is rather diabolical: the stronger an act of violence is felt to be, the more we tend to talk about it. For example, analysis of Twitter posts has shown that each moral-emotional word a tweet contains increases its likelihood of being retweeted by 17%.⁷ Similarly, feelings of surprise or disgust are enough to make a post go viral. On top of this, algorithmic sorting of information⁸ increases the visibility of violent messages. In fact, the **greater the violence, the stronger the emotion, and the more powerful the mechanics of cognitive bias. Moreover, our tolerance for violence varies depending on where we are and the era we live in:** this is one of the weaknesses of societies that are used to abundance and peace.
- Another of the traps into which cognitive warfare lures us is that of **confusing causes with consequences.** Following Max Weber’s advice, consider two abstract ideal types of society. In the first, people tend to trust each other and institutions; in the second, a lack of trust leads to polarisation, which turns other people into enemies with whom no compromise is possible. It is in this second type of society that cognitive attacks are particularly effective. **Make no mistake: emotional warfare doesn’t create polarisation, it increases it. The reason emotional warfare is so powerful in the West is that western countries have entered into an age of distrust.**⁹
- **The crisis of democracy, the crisis of confidence, political polarisation and cognitive warfare are all linked,** then, and it is our own flaws that hostile political operators exploit. For example, Israel has fallen into a trap laid by Hamas in response what Dani Filc has described as the post-populism of Benjamin Netanyahu¹⁰ (similar to that of Viktor Orbán), shored up by a three-tier strategy of economic neoliberalism, authoritarianism and conservative nationalism. According to sociologist Eva Illouz, this post-populism is fuelled by four types of emotion.¹¹ The first is fear, which legitimises authoritarianism. Then come disgust and resentment, which

underpin conservative nationalism. Finally, all of this is mixed with a “carefully cultivated love for one’s country”. Illouz also contends that these same kinds of emotional factors contribute to Donald Trump’s popularity.¹²

- Finally, **cognitive warfare attacks not just our emotions but also our doubts and qualms, keeping us frozen in a state in which we find it difficult to react. This may be an old strategic tactic but it is increasingly formidable in a world of ever-increasing complexity and shocks.** At the end of the Cold War, the US army even came up with an acronym, VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity), to denote **an age in which consensus and certainty are faltering. In fact, our cognitive landscape is no longer the same as it was the Cold War.** “Ideologies are less pervasive, beliefs more diversified. [...] We have entered into a period of multiple engagements characterised by a tolerance for causal ambiguity”.¹³ **This cognitive misalignment is the perfect mental mirror image of geopolitical fragmentation.**
- In *The Art of the Novel*, Milan Kundera intuited **this time of ambiguity:** post-modernity, he wrote, would be a time of “terminal paradoxes” in which many truths previously considered absolute could well come to be seen as relative. This contemporary ambiguity now permeates us all, creating a sense of unease. And this is what emotional warfare taps into: our difficulty in facing up to a reality that has become “systemic, hybrid, global, liquid or hazy”.¹⁴

What is the sixth war?

Each of us has a cognitive personality, which represents our spontaneous relationship to the world, constructed out of our habits of thinking, seeing, listening, memorising and feeling. These habits of being and feeling are shaped by, among other things, our culture, history and education. It is this core personality that is the target of cognitive attacks, which target beliefs, norms, motivations, emotions, identity and ideology. In very practical terms, the aim is to redirect people’s thinking and disrupt their decision-making systems (by directing action or inhibiting it through indecision or cognitive overload). This gives rise to cognitive battlegrounds, i.e. “social spaces in which worldviews are

⁶ Baudelaire, *Le Spleen de Paris*, 1862

⁷ William J. Brady et al, “Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks”, *Academy of Sciences*, 2017

⁸ 70% of videos viewed on YouTube are recommended by the algorithm. See *Rapport Bronner: Les lumières à l’ère numérique*, 2022

⁹ See Éloi Laurent, *L’économie de la confiance*, La Découverte, 2019: “The digital transition is creating ‘intermittent societies’ in which continuity of human relationships is becoming problematic.”

¹⁰ Dani Filc, *The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism*, Routledge, 2009

¹¹ Eva Illouz, *The Emotional Life of Populism: How Fear, Disgust, Resentment, and Love Undermine Democracy*, Polity, 2023

¹² Ruth Igielnik, “Trump Support Remains Unmoved by Investigations, Poll Finds”, *The New York Times*, 22 September 2022

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Sophie Chassat, *Complexité. Critique d’une idéologie contemporaine*, Fondapol, June 2023

constructed" (social media, television studios, think tanks, NGOs, etc.).¹⁵

Strange echoes of the grammar of Clausewitz deep in our brains

In fact, when we look into the idea of cognitive influence, we find the **grammar of Clausewitz, which consists of locating the enemy's centre of gravity so as to throw them off balance** – an approach with which judokas are very familiar. Donald Rumsfeld perfectly drew out the metaphor back in 2006: "We are fighting a war in which the survival of our way of life is at stake.

And the center of gravity of that struggle is not just the battlefield. It is a test of wills and it will be won or lost in the court of global public opinion. While the enemy is skillful at manipulating the media and using the tools of communications to their advantage, we have an advantage as well: truth is on our side, and, ultimately, truth wins out."¹⁶

The two axes of cognitive warfare

In an age like ours when the balance of power is being redrawn, the objective of influencing international opinion is much less "simple", revolving around two axes.

The first lies at the heart of old consolidated democracies. Western states must simultaneously influence the outside world and combat domestic political polarisation which hostile powers seek to exacerbate.

The second axis concerns public opinion in the huge but ill-defined Global South. This new axis of gravity is one of the key differences compared with the United States' worldview at the time of Rumsfeld: **how the global scenario plays out is now just as dependent on public opinion from the Global South as it is on that from the Global North.**

The age of grand narratives

Public opinion or opinions? The distinction is not neutral. To talk of public opinions, in the plural, is to frame the world as being cognitively fragmented, with a multiplicity of beliefs and worldviews, fuelling polarisation and violence. Conversely, to use the singular (global public opinion) is to assume that a global meeting of minds – at least when it comes to some issues – is possible, and perhaps even to acknowledge a "planetary evolution" of the "sphere of human thought"¹⁷. This is obviously an essential distinction (particularly when it comes to environmental issues and our ability to reach consensus and work together across borders).

¹⁵ Christian Harbulot, *La guerre par l'information : la querelle des anciens et des modernes*, Ecole de Guerre Economique

¹⁶ Donald Rumsfeld, "The Media War on Terror", Project Syndicate, 2006

¹⁷ G. S. Levit, *The Biosphere and the Noosphere*, Theories of V. I. Vernadsky and P. Teilhard de Chardin: A Methodological Essay, *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences*, 2000

Moreover, this hypothesis of a collective consciousness has a long history: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin described it as early as 1922, coining the term "noosphere". But it has reached a new level in the age of global connectivity.

Indeed, US strategies have given this concept of the noosphere an unexpected second wind: in 1999, a report published by the Rand Corporation explained that it is now the noosphere that states must control ("global interconnectivity is generating a new fabric for world power"¹⁸). This means "conflicts will be won not by the biggest bomb but by the best story".¹⁹

From that point forward, the idea of *noopolitik* became one of the foundations of American grand strategy: a new approach to the art of governing based on "the primacy of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics" linked to the emergence of the noosphere²⁰.

However astonishing it may be that a French Jesuit priest should inspire US strategy from beyond the grave, the undeniable fact is that this marked the onset of an all-out war of narratives, and thus a war for hearts and minds.

In fact, the West's strategic reading of the world struggles to take on board the possibility of scenarios in which there are multipolar powers, and therefore also the importance of winning over the opinions of the Global South.

Even now, three arguments are often still marshalled to relegate the strategic rise of the Global South to a secondary phenomenon: the first emphasises the disparate nature of the countries that make up the Global South (and the latent hostility that sometimes exists among them, particularly between India and China); the second highlights their limited monetary clout (the dollar is still king); and the third points out that many countries still rely on US protection.

A modern political history of double standards

While all of the above may be true, it's also clear that much of the world's population has undergone an ideological shift reflected in widespread open criticism of the West, accused of constant double standards that are now undermining its moral authority. **The Global South is finding its ideological unity around this criticism.** In fact, the West has long been an object of moral condemnation; it's just that this has tended to be confined to the margins. **The conflicts in Ukraine**

¹⁸ Ibid, page 41

¹⁹ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward An American Information Strategy*, Rand Corporation, 1999

²⁰ Ibid.

and Israel have given this kind of criticism an overarching political dimension that must be taken very seriously: it is one of the most important cognitive battlegrounds of our time.

Initially, the ideological reappearance of the Global South on the geopolitical radar was mainly a consequence of the war in Ukraine, born of the pragmatism of nations refusing to take sides, chief among them India and Saudi Arabia.

As time went on, however, the war in Israel ideologically united the Global South as western double standards connected with painful memories of colonisation and anti-American resentment that had lingered since Vietnam and Iraq (not to mention Hiroshima and Nagasaki). And then, finally, all of this began to resonate... in the Global North.

A strategic surprise: the Global South connects with part of the Global Northern elite

The upshot of all this is a single, united anti-American public opinion formed out of a confusing but wide-ranging patchwork. This ideological Global South is talking to the Global North, not through the usual back door of recalcitrant elites but through the wide-open front door of America's largest universities²¹, riven, polarised and radicalised by the conflict in Gaza.

This ideological fragmentation of future western elites must be seen as a genuine warning sign of this new cognitive geopolitics. Indeed, through this new South/North transmission channel, the charge of double standards could have long-lasting political ramifications in the North, regardless of how local military conflicts evolve.

In fact, the issue of double standards is becoming a connecting point between global geopolitical fragmentation and domestic political polarisation in western democracies.

Will cognitive warfare spare the economy?

The answer, of course, is no. Cognitive warfare in the economic space is intense, having a sometimes brutal impact on "agents' preferences" (particularly trade-offs between consumption, saving and investment). Consumers' and investors' emotional states – their beliefs and their perceptions about the future – are thus one of channels through which geopolitical shocks are transmitted to the economic climate.

Nor is theory immune from emotion. Keynes observed as much in a 1933 lecture, when he spoke

of his change of mind on the subject of free trade. He confessed that his conviction in favour of the latter was, until 1932, based on what he thought were "fundamental truths", namely "an economic doctrine [...] but almost as a part of the moral law".

He went on to explain that he had changed, advocating for national self-sufficiency, but that this change was bound up with his emotions. "But mainly I attribute my change of outlook [...] to my hopes and fears and pre-occupations, along with those of many or most, I believe, of this generation throughout the world, being different from what they were."²² At times of radical uncertainty and fear, the "animal spirits" rule.

Armed forces have taken on board cognitive warfare

What is harder to grasp is that, in the clash between the two great powers of China and the US, the fact that an unquestionable, indisputable geopolitical victory "on the ground" is impossible means the cognitive battle will be all the more crucial.²³ **Indeed, the interdependencies between these two giants make any rapid victory unlikely, unless one or other country suffers some kind of domestic collapse. Against this backdrop, shifting public opinion will be a key determinant of the China-US scenario**, which is why armed forces have factored it into their overall strategies. And it is precisely here that the dividing line between military and civilian, and between war and peace, becomes blurred.

Strategic escalation

A number of changes lie behind the rise of cognitive warfare, a battlefield already amply explored by the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians since the days of the Second World War. The first such change was described in 1999 in a Chinese bestseller²⁴ that highlighted how dual technologies broadened the scope of war by blurring the boundaries between the military and civilian sectors. "Our closest enemies are in our smartphones", wrote General Thierry Burkhard more recently²⁵; the war in Ukraine is now seen as "the first high-intensity conflict in the age of smartphones, drones and connected objects"²⁶.

The second change was the advent of the information society. **In 1997, the US made information dominance a key component of its strategy; China took the concept further with the**

²¹ Alessia Lefébure, *Quand le conflit israélo-palestinien déborde sur les campus américains*, *L'Économiste*, November 2023

²² John Maynard Keynes, *National Self-Sufficiency*, *The Yale Review*, Volume 22, No. 4, June 1933

²³ Michael D. Matthews, "Psychology and a Less Lethal Military Strategy", *Psychology Today*, 2014

²⁴ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Pan American Publishing Company, 2002

²⁵ Thierry Burkhard, "Durcir l'armée de terre", *Revue de la Défense nationale*, Q3 2020, page 5

²⁶ David Colon, *La guerre de l'information, les États à la conquête de nos esprits*, Tallandier, 2023, page 364

idea of “mind superiority”²⁷. Four tactics are employed to target elites and populations: perception manipulation, cutting off historical memory, changing the paradigm of thinking, and deconstructing symbols.²⁸

In most countries, enemy interference will be used as a pretext for incorporating cognitive warfare into inter-operational strategy – a task that will only be made easier by the fact that enemy interference is so difficult to prove. True or not, this means cognitive competition between countries will inevitably escalate. For example, there are those who have called out US influence in the so-called colour revolutions, while the West has condemned interference in the Taiwanese elections in 2018 as well as more recent US and European elections. In reality, while the rise of cognitive warfare is certainly related to geopolitical tensions, it is clearly also driven by convergence between nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science (known as NBIC).

A war of sorcerer's apprentices?

The object of cognitive warfare goes beyond the battle for information, in other words the struggle between fake news and the truth – a battle which, as **Brandolini's law tells us, is more often lost by proponents of the truth than by the spreaders of fake news: it has been proved that it takes an order of magnitude more time and energy to refute a fake news story or rumour than it does to produce it.** Furthermore, there is a greater “cognitive advantage” to be gained by creating confusing hype around something that is true than by producing a fake news story, which runs the risk of being rejected. “The strength of a cognitive attack lies not in deception or misinformation but in stirring up a relevant controversy backed by objective facts. [...] The more fitting the controversy, the harder it is to prove a conspiracy, even if only in theory.”²⁹

Information warfare and emotional warfare may, however, have one thing in common: their uncontrollable nature. This is something all the sorcerer's apprentices playing in this space are aware of, but that isn't stopping them. For example, the US Army is thinking about how to militarise memes, using the analogy that, since “ideologies possess the same theoretical characteristics as a disease [...], then a similar method and routine

can/should be applied to combating them. Memes can and should be used like medicine to inoculate the enemy and generate popular support.”³⁰

Ultimately, then, cognitive attacks can be counterproductive. Emotional weapons are difficult to wield, not only in geopolitics: a communication underpinned by shocking messages about a climate apocalypse runs the risk of deterring public engagement³¹. As Philippe Baumard, who specialises in this field, warns, “Cognition is poorly understood, and yet everyone uses it and claims a kind of naive expertise”³².

How does all this work?

Cognitive warfare plays on our biases and mental flaws. Close to 300 cognitive biases have reportedly been documented to date³³, structured around four key psychological traits: the search for meaning, the need to act fast, the tendency to react to information overload and the need to sort out what we “need to remember”³⁴.

These biases range from stereotypes (national, sexist, physical, age-related, etc.) to halo effects³⁵ and confirmation bias – a tendency to seek out information that confirms our opinions or those of the group to which we belong. Peer bias is a particular problem, leading us to align ourselves with the group consensus through unconscious mental or verbal shifts. **This results in the creation of “filter bubbles” that keep us shut inside separate microsocieties.** We obviously tend to react strongly against any idea or event that contradicts our beliefs.

“When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted for it, and were enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omenmongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily.” (Thucydides, Book VIII, Chapter 1, Section 1)

²⁷ Zeng Huafeng and Shi Haiming, *Mind Superiority: The Rules of War and National Security Strategy in the Global Media Age*, Academy of Military Science Press, 2014

²⁸ Luo Yuzhen, Li Wei, Wang Ruifa, Lei Wei, Liao Dongsheng and Zhu Yingying, “Characteristics and Key Technologies of the Common Domain for the Cognitive Domain”, *Defense Technology Review*, April 2018

²⁹ Christian Harbulot and Didier Lucas, *La guerre cognitive : l'arme de la connaissance*, Lavauzelle, 2002

³⁰ Source: [memetics-a-growth-industry-in-us-military-operations.pdf](https://www.governamerica.com/memetics-a-growth-industry-in-us-military-operations.pdf) (governamerica.com)

³¹ Saffron O'Neill and Sophie Nicholson-Cole, “Fear Won't Do It”: Promoting Positive Engagement with Climate Change Through

Visual and Iconic Representations, *Science Communication*, Volume 30, Number 3, 2009

³² Philippe Baumard, *Les limites d'une économie de la guerre cognitive*, in Christian Harbulot and Didier Lucas (eds.), *La guerre cognitive*, Editions Lavauzelle, 2002, pages 35-55

³³ RECOBIA Project (see <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/285010>).

³⁴ Florence Pouzet, “L'impact des biais cognitifs en intelligence économique”, *École de Guerre Économique*, 2022

³⁵ The tendency to form a positive impression of a person based on a single character trait, qualification, etc. The effect can also apply negatively.

Three keys to analysing cognitive and emotional warfare

Identify cognitive battlegrounds. Not all events become cognitive battlegrounds. For that to happen, a situation must come up against a key element of power or ideology and be seized upon and *made into* an event by actors who operating in the cognitive domain. This is what happened with the attacks by Hamas and the ensuing bombing of Gaza; it is a trap that lies in wait for all governments held hostage by public opinion. Conversely, the disappearance of Nagorno-Karabakh was neutralised as a global cognitive battleground despite the Armenian drama and the strategic importance of the Caucasus. Tension between the US and China is a cognitive battleground, and the battle is set to rumble on for years to come. Lastly, some moments are more conducive to cognitive and information attacks: the Taiwanese and US elections this coming year are prime examples. Taiwan is one place in the world where cognitive warfare is being waged particularly fiercely.

Take the long view. Some conflicts (e.g. the Iraq War) can have political effects that reverberate for years while others are forgotten: "Sensemaking is a retrospective process, i.e. people assign meaning to events and actions, sometimes long after they occur".³⁶ In fact, the effects of major geopolitical events tend to come in waves whose size can vary over time. It is therefore essential to wait before definitively characterising the nature and scope of a geopolitical event so as to avoid recency bias – a tendency to overweight the importance of recent events over past ones.³⁷

Identify channels of contagion. The effects of a geopolitical shock in terms of cognitive contagion are complex: images, narratives and events have direct, indirect and cascading effects on the populations not only of immediately neighbouring countries but also of the wider region and more distant countries. These effects vary depending on how closely aligned people are in terms of their culture, language, and political and religious identity as well as how politically divided the country is. The conflict in Israel is spilling over into the wider world through a great many channels of contagion, both religious and political.

Geopolitics accentuates cognitive bias

Geopolitical tensions increase radical uncertainty and thereby heighten all the comforting biases that prompt us to look for

reassuring ways of framing events. When people are in the grip of collective anxiety, the desire for accuracy seems to give way to the temptation to "avert uncertainty by coming up with theories whose proponents are determined to confirm them at any cost"³⁸. Cognitive warfare thus relies on the fact that uncertainty inevitably triggers a natural temptation to rewrite history in such a way as to flatten and normalise it.

Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that, while feelings of confusion or frustration stimulate an individual's curiosity, they also reduce the scrutiny the individual applies to new information³⁹ through a kind of "information tunnelling". But that's not all: the cognitive sciences tend to show that the greater the "sacrificial" charge assigned to an event, the more powerful the associated interpretive framework, bearing out the work of the late René Girard, a philosopher who theorised that the scapegoat is one of the most powerful engines of history.⁴⁰

What can be done?

First, cognitive questions must be treated with the importance they deserve. Let no one think we can escape these issues. Next, while none of us can bring to conscious awareness the full range of phenomena that affect us psychologically, we must admit to our own fallibility and resist the temptation to believe that cognition is simply a matter of dividing the world up into friends and enemies. **Our fallibility is nested in our cascading chains of decisions, hidden from view by reassuring pictures, pretty curves and well-constructed speeches.** "Fuelled by cognitive biases that make us automatically see what we want to believe, we become puppets controlled by our own inclinations".⁴¹

Finally, we can try to **take a step back and understand how narratives are created, along with their threads and the beliefs that underpin them.** "We cannot ignore networks in our thinking. We must henceforth think through them and under their influence. And that means moving away from scientific thinking and towards literary thinking, and accepting that the challenges networks pose to humanity are not technological but rather philosophical [...]. There was a time when we wanted everyone to master the code; now we must work to free everyone from its effects."⁴²

[French version](#) edited in December 2023

³⁶ Karl E. Weick, *Sensemaking in Organizations*, Sage Publications, 1995

³⁷ Kathy Cao, Sean Glaister, Adriana Pena, Danbi Rhee, William Rong and Alexander Rovalino, "Countering cognitive warfare: awareness and resilience", Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London, *NATO Review*, May 2021

³⁸ Frank Furedi, *How Fear Works: Culture of Fear in the Twenty-First Century*, Bloomsbury, 2018

³⁹ Andrew MacDonald and Ryan Ratcliffe, "Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension", *US Naval Institute*, April 2023

⁴⁰ Philippe Baumard, *ibid.*

⁴¹ Bruno Patino, *Submersion*, Grasset, October 2023

⁴² Bruno Patino, *ibid.*, page 124

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