The number one risk transmission channel is, of course, oil: suppliers to Asian countries are mainly located in the Gulf, resulting in a direct impact on prices and energy-intensive value chains. In this regard, just about every country in the region is affected, with Indonesia and Malaysia – both oil producers (albeit still net importers) – having a slight edge. 

Other raw materials and intermediate goods that pass through the Strait of Hormuz also need to be monitored: gas, of course, which powers production chains in North Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan) and India; and aluminium, plastics made from oil residues, and fertilisers, where a shortage or a sharp increase in prices could weaken the Indian and Indonesian agricultural sectors. 

As the conflict drags on, the issue of human flows will become increasingly central: tourist flows to Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) – much of which passed through the Gulf from Europe – and, above all, flows of workers. For some countries (India, Philippines), the matter of remittances from diaspora populations is far from trivial.

Lastly, the United States’ traditional allies (South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) are already worried about transfers of military manpower and defence capabilities deployed in the area thus far. This shift towards a new conflict zone reinforces the idea that these countries will have to rely more than ever on their domestic and regional resources, rather than on the US, to ensure their security and maintain the necessary deterrence against neighbouring hostile powers (China, North Korea and Russia).